When Disability Is Not Enough: Lessons from McCulloch v. McCulloch on Modifying Texas Spousal Maintenance
Lessons from McCulloch v. McCulloch on Modifying Texas Spousal Maintenance
The Austin Court of Appeals’ opinion in McCulloch v. McCulloch, No. 03-24-00518-CV, 2026 WL 1872638, filed June 30, 2026, is a useful reminder that a party seeking to modify support obligations in Texas must do more than point to a changed label, diagnosis, or later disability determination. The movant must prove a true material and substantial change in circumstances with evidence that allows the trial court to compare the relevant circumstances at the time of the prior order with the circumstances at the time of the modification hearing. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Willie McCulloch’s request to modify both child support and spousal maintenance.
The parties divorced in 2019 after a marriage of almost twenty-three years. The decree found that their child was disabled and that support should continue indefinitely. It also found that Willie’s gross annual income was at least $275,117, ordered him to pay $4,500 per month in child support, found that Jeannie was unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability, and awarded her spousal maintenance of $4,585.28 per month for an indefinite period. The decree also recited that the parties had entered into a partial agreement incident to divorce and that the decree merged that agreement with the court’s orders.
Shortly after the divorce, Willie sought to modify his support obligations. In 2021, the trial court denied his request, found no material and substantial change in circumstances, and found that Willie was intentionally unemployed. Later, after the Office of the Attorney General filed an enforcement action, Willie again counterpetitioned to modify his obligations, contending that his disability and loss of employment constituted a material and substantial change.
2024 Hearing
At the 2024 hearing, Willie testified that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. But he also acknowledged that he had suffered from depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder since 2005. He testified that his condition had worsened and that he could not work, but the court noted that none of his medical records were admitted into evidence. He also testified that he had not held a job since 2018, had previously worked as a computer engineer and in sales for data companies, and had been found disabled by the Social Security Administration as of November 1, 2019.
The evidence also created credibility problems for Willie. The opinion describes testimony about travel during a period when Willie reportedly told a doctor he rarely left his parents’ home, bank records reflecting unexplained deposits and cash withdrawals, and testimony that Willie received a substantial Social Security lump-sum payment but used the funds to pay his mother, his wife, and his attorney rather than reducing his child or spousal support obligations. The trial court expressly found that Willie appeared untruthful and that Jeannie appeared truthful.
The appellate court began with the familiar rule: an obligor may seek modification of child support or spousal maintenance if there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances since the relevant order. For spousal maintenance, the governing statute is Texas Family Code § 8.057(c); for child support, the governing statute is Texas Family Code § 156.401(a)(1). The party seeking modification bears the burden of proof.
The Court’s Reasoning
The court’s reasoning is especially important for modification practice. Willie argued that his Social Security disability determination and lack of employment should have compelled a finding of material and substantial change. The court disagreed. The key issue was not simply whether Willie had a disability determination. The question was whether the evidence showed a material change from the circumstances existing when the prior support order was entered. Because Willie’s mental-health conditions had existed for many years and evidence about those issues had been before the court at the time of the divorce, the trial court could conclude that those conditions were anticipated circumstances rather than changed circumstances.
The court distinguished cases involving a new post-order disability and instead treated the case more like those where a disability determination is not enough if the underlying condition existed at the time of the prior order. The court also emphasized the absence of comparative financial evidence. Without reliable financial data comparing the parties’ circumstances at the time of the prior order with their circumstances at the modification hearing, the movant could not carry the burden of showing a substantial change. Willie did not adequately establish his income sources, disability-payment history, expenses, or the current and historical financial circumstances of Jeannie and the child.
On spousal maintenance, Willie also argued that the trial court could not continue a maintenance obligation based on imputed income or intentional unemployment. The Austin Court of Appeals acknowledged its recent holding in Harwood that spousal maintenance must be set based on gross income, not earning potential. But Willie’s problem was procedural: if the original or earlier maintenance order improperly rested on earning potential, the time to attack that order was by direct challenge to that order—not in a later collateral attack through a new modification proceeding.
Texas Family Law Codes
Texas Family Code § 8.057 is important here. A court may modify a maintenance order after a hearing and a proper showing of a material and substantial change in circumstances, but the modification applies only to payments accruing after the motion to modify is filed, and the court may not increase maintenance to an amount or duration exceeding the amount or remaining duration of the original maintenance order. Texas Family Code § 8.056 separately provides for termination of future maintenance upon death of either party or remarriage of the obligee, and after hearing if the obligee cohabits with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or romantic relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis.
By contrast, child support modification is governed by Texas Family Code § 156.401. A child support order may be modified if the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order have materially and substantially changed, or, in many cases, if three years have passed and the existing order differs from the guideline amount by either 20 percent or $100. But if the original order was an agreed order that varied from guidelines, modification may require a material and substantial change. The opinion also notes that a possible Social Security benefit for the child could potentially entitle the obligor to a credit under Texas Family Code § 157.009, but the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to continue the case while waiting on an uncertain SSA decision.
Family Law Practice Pointers
First, a modification case is a comparison case. The movant should be prepared to prove both sides of the equation: the circumstances at the time of the prior order and the circumstances at the time of the modification hearing. Without that comparison, even compelling current hardship may not be enough.
Second, disability evidence needs to be developed carefully. A Social Security disability determination may matter, but it is not automatically dispositive—especially when the underlying condition existed before or at the time of the prior order. Medical records, disability-payment history, work history, earning capacity evidence, and credible testimony all matter.
Third, do not rely on “guidelines mismatch” alone. In a child support modification, the guidelines may be relevant, but the court in McCulloch emphasized that a child support order’s noncompliance with guidelines does not, by itself, establish a material and substantial change warranting modification.
Fourth, spousal maintenance modifications have a ceiling. Maintenance can potentially be reduced, shortened, or—in the right case—terminated, but § 8.057(c)(2) does not allow the court to increase maintenance beyond the amount or remaining duration of the original maintenance order.
Finally, direct appeals matter. If the complaint is that the original maintenance award violated the Family Code, that issue generally must be raised by direct challenge to that order. A later modification proceeding is not a safe vehicle for a collateral attack on the original award.
Bottom line: McCulloch is a good reminder that Texas trial courts have broad discretion in support-modification cases. The party seeking relief must bring the evidence needed to prove an actual, material, and substantial change—not merely a continuation of circumstances that were known, anticipated, or litigated before.
Contact Brad LaMorgese To Discuss Your Family Law Issue
Brad M. LaMorgese is Board Certified in Family Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization and focuses his practice on sophisticated family law matters involving significant financial complexity. He regularly represents clients in high-net-worth divorce litigation, complex property disputes, business ownership cases, and strategic family law matters requiring long-term financial planning.
To schedule a consultation, call our family law attorney at LaMorgese Family Law at 214-295-7200. Brad LaMorgese represents clients throughout Dallas and Dallas County, Texas, in complex family law matters involving substantial assets and significant financial interests.
Disclaimer: This article is provided for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Because every case is fact-specific, readers should consult qualified legal counsel regarding their individual circumstances.
